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ABSTRACT 
This case study will analyze the nature of cross-border conflicts and deterrence 
measures in the Horn of Africa with a focus on the pastoral communities of Pokot, 
Turkana, and the Karamojong. These communities in northwestern Kenya and eastern 
Uganda are under intolerable stress and they are involved in a violent struggle to survive. 
While insecurity in this area is often characterized as arising from competition over 
scarce resources, there are broader dimensions to local conflicts. These revolve around a 
long history of social, cultural, economic and political exclusion. The states’ role in the 
provision of security and support to pastoral communities is, on the whole, poor. Both 
countries have a tendency to sometimes use excessive military force. Pastoral 
communities have reasons to feel alienated. Lack of political will and corruption likewise 
frustrates efforts to keep the peace. This study seeks to examine the interplay among raids 
and counter-raids, internal security, the rule of law, and democratic governance. It 
proposes a number of steps for achieving greater stability in the region. 
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A.  BACKGROUND  
 




The term “Horn of Africa” is used to describe the countries of Somalia, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, and all their neighboring states in Eastern Africa. The Republic of 
Kenya and Uganda have experienced different types of cross-border conflicts from 
independence to the present day. These conflicts range from internal disputes between 
different groups in Kenya to cross-border confrontations with groups from neighboring 
countries like Uganda, coupled with spillover effects from regional conflicts in the 
greater Horn of Africa. These conflicts manifest themselves violently and nonviolently. 
The causes of the conflicts are many and complex, including poor governance, poverty, 
drought, famine, competition for scarce resources, and identity-based rivalries.  
These conflicts have caused extensive local crises, drawn heavily on military 
resources, and have had an adverse impact on economic development in the region. The 
impact of violent conflict has manifested itself psychologically, physically, and 
economically, going beyond the material and affecting the lives of thousands of women, 
children, and men. In fact, for many Kenyans and Ugandans, this is the form of 
terrorism/ethnic terrorism (Waldmann, Peter, p. 245) they most worry about. Traditional 
morality has collapsed following a rupture in the structure of social relations on which 
peoples’ lives were hinged. The Pokots, Turkana, and Karamojong strive to keep some 
livestock and those fortunate few who have incomes from trade and regular employment 
continue to invest in livestock (Markakis, 1993, pp. 147-148). Throughout their history, 
these pastoral communities have engaged in a multiplicity of economic activities, making 
use of a wide variety of resources within their reach and often modifying their animal 
production given the demands of other pursuits. Many now engage in subsistence 
farming. They also trade and make handicrafts. But some smuggle and engage in raids 
and make war on their own or for others. 
Pastoralists raise different types of livestock. The characteristics of the animals 
and local environmental conditions determine the number and composition of the herds. 
Pastoral production systems are, by and large, a product of climatic and environmental 
factors. The objective of the pastoralist is to accumulate and maintain as much wealth as 
possible in terms of livestock. Pastoralists have been able to eke out a living from the 
harsh and unpredictable environment for centuries. In their long history, livestock 
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provided not only a valuable source of food, but also acted as a reserve of wealth, a 
redeemer from damage, a sacrificial gift, and a means of marriage and other ceremonial 
payments (Salih, 1992, p. 27). 
Conflicts have political, economic, social, and cultural implications and contribute 
to the lowering of economic productivity, weakening of political institutions of 
governance, incapacity to provide essential services, destruction and depletion of existing 
resources, loss of food production, and capital flight. It may be possible to measure the 
cost of conflict in economic terms by assessing the loss of potential foreign and domestic 
investment due to fear of crime and insecurity, loss of income from tourism, and losses in 
government sectors like agriculture. Other direct consequences of violent conflict are the 
influx of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) from neighboring countries into 
Kenya. This is further complicated by the prevalence of small arms and light weapons in 
major towns and in pastoral areas in northern, northeastern, coastal and western Kenya 
along its international borders. This phenomenon is aggravated by neighboring civil wars 
and regional drought. 
The border areas of Kenya and Uganda have, over the last three or four decades, 
been a major arena for a variety of low-intensity conflicts, some of which are linked to 
wider cross-border and regional conflicts. The roots of these conflicts are ecological. A 
history of economic and social marginalization looms large in all border conflicts within 
the HOA. Increased competition over resources, reduced access to land, water, and other 
natural resources due to increasing demographic and environmental pressure from within 
and without, and reduced access to credit, markets, and extension services that culminate 
in poverty, all play a role. This thesis will try to analyze the history of these conflicts, the 
evolution of government policies, the efforts made by non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and the Interagency Organization (IO), peace initiatives, and possible deterrence 
measures to bilaterally curb this menace. 
B.  SCOPE AND PURPOSE  
This thesis seeks to examine the historical background of cross-border conflict, 
the security situation in the region, the nature of local and regional constraints, the 
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socioeconomic impact of raids and counter-raids, the past and present approaches taken 
by states and their limitations, the response of NGOs, deterrence, lessons learned, and the 
way forward in the form of recommendations. 
C.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In conducting this analysis, the study addresses the following questions: 
• What is the historical background of the conflict? 
• Why do the communities continue to fight; who are the parties involved, 
and what are their aims? 
• What are the negative effects of cross-border conflicts? 
• Are measures being taken to curb this violence? What security measures 
have the governments of Uganda and Kenya taken to stop the escalation of 
cross-border conflicts? Could these measures be made more effective? 
• What else can be done? 
D.  METHODOLOGY 
The research methods employed in this thesis involve the use of primary 
sources—personal interviews were conducted in both in Kenya and Uganda—and 
secondary sources. I used a three-phased approach to analyze the problem and relied on 
personal knowledge and experience where necessary. The analysis draws on a wide 
spectrum of views from individuals, organizations, and institutions, both governmental 
and non-governmental. It is my intention that this document contributes to decision-
making regarding cross-border conflict. 
E.  ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY  
The present chapter is my introduction to the problem; it lays out the general 
description of the cross-border conflict within the context of the broader Horn of Africa 
(HOA) with a particular focus on the study area: the Kenyan–Ugandan border. Chapter II 
highlights the nature of the area under study and discusses pastoralism, traditional and 
modern pastoralist resources, and the tribes involved in conflict. Chapter III presents a 
historical analysis of cross-border conflict and the relations among these pastoral 
communities during the pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial periods. Chapter III also 
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discusses Kenyan and Ugandan policy regarding cross-border conflict. Chapter IV will 
follow with a discussion of socioeconomic and political impacts and the strain on the 
military and the security forces in general. Chapter V addresses possible means of 
deterrence and resolutions that people interviewed felt should be addressed in order to 
alleviate touchy and long-term problems. This chapter looks at past approaches, lessons 
learned, and approaches presently implemented, as well as successes and failures where 
applicable. Chapter VI addresses what can be done for these needy communities that 
have been in conflict for so long. Chapter VII summarizes the key issues raised during 
the research and offers recommendations that may help these communities through direct 
and indirect approaches, and with the assistance of international partners as a concerned 
audience.  
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II.  THE NATURE OF THE AREA 
A.  PASTORALISM 
Pastoralism describes the movement of communities in semiarid and arid areas as 
people search for pasture for their livestock. This practice is common or routine in the 
greater Horn of Africa and particularly in the area under study. Due to a combination of 
rainfall patterns and the nature of the soil and vegetation, most of the Pokots, Turkana, 
and Karamojong keep large herds of livestock. Plant growth is only possible during a 
very short period of the year in most areas. The spatial and temporal rainfall patterns lead 
to very limited and seasonal availability of resources for livestock. This exposes 
pastoralists to immense risks and uncertainties as they trek long distances in search of 
grazing and water for their animals. The dry season is intense, from November to March. 
The rainy season typically lasts from April to August. September and October are 
transitional months. Between October and January, there is no water in most semiarid 
areas of either country. Water will only be found in localized areas, since most rivers are 
seasonal. From February to March, the Pokots, the Turkana and the Karamojong of 
Uganda experience complete drought until April when the rains return.  
These conditions force pastoral communities to move from one place to another 
as a strategy, because resources are so scarce and scattered. Pastoral groups in the region 
(including the Toposa and Diding’a of Sudan) have adopted different strategies to meet 
minimum subsistence demands for survival from one season to the next. Among the 
Pokot, Turkana, and Karamojong, each pastoral group has specific grazing areas they 
exploit as communal grazing areas; that is, members of a specific community can access 
those resources belonging to that community. The three communities move herds 
following the first rains to take advantage of soft grasses and to avoid cattle’s destroying 
crops in the vicinity of permanent settlements. This is an initial attempt to conserve dry-
season fodder. Settlements are concentrated mostly in the central plains where sandy 




rains decrease, around the same time crops have been harvested in the settlement areas, 
the herds return to take advantage of abundant water and stocks of harvested crops, rich 
in food value.  
During the dry season, when drought intensifies, the Pokot, Turkana, and 
Karamojong cattle keepers find pastoral resources outside their borders in neighboring 
districts. Before moving out into theses districts, they usually send reconnaissance teams 
to negotiate entry and the use of resources owned by another community, in order to 
avoid friction. Ideally, pastoralists move into neighboring areas belonging to those with 
whom they share some common clan lineage. For instance, the Matheniko clan of 
Karamojong moves towards the Bokora –Teso–Karamojong border, not in the direction 
of the Jie, who are perceived to be hostile. While the Pokot either move to Kapchorwa to 
join the Sebei or their Pokot counterparts in Uganda, the Turkana mix with the 
Karamojong along their grazing areas since they have some common culture. These 
intertribal meetings can lead to conflict, however, when disagreements arise over what 
the interlopers do in the new location and the quantity or quality of resources they are 
allowed to access.  
I realized during my interviews and research that the different pastoral groups 
have adopted survival strategies to cope with resource variability and scarcity. However, 
central to their strategy is the sharing of resources located across borders that are 
seasonally tracked by cattle keepers moving their herds. The movements of pastoral 
groups from Kenya, likewise, are never haphazard. Much of the time, it is Kenyan cattle 
keepers who move towards the common border with Uganda in search of grazing. The 
Turkana pastoralists move westwards towards the Karamojong border for water in the 
Kidepo Valley. Kenyan Pokot move towards the Kapchorwa, Kanyerus, and the trans-
Nzoia districts to graze their livestock and make maximum use of reservoirs that were 
constructed on farms during the colonial period. Sometimes, the Pokot from Uganda 
move into West Pokot of Kenya during the dry season to avoid raids by Karamojong 
warriors. Cross-border grazing enables different pastoral groups to gain access to 
resources wherever and whenever they may be seasonally available. When pasture and 
water are physically located in an area that belongs to one tribe, the right to use them lies 
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with tribal elders. Tensions often build in the dry season as members of one ethnic group 
try to exercise their rights to exclude nonmembers. Tensions erupt when there is 
unannounced entry into a territory belonging to another group. Occasionally, disputes end 
up in full-blown inter-ethnic wars.  
It is important to understand that cows are rarely slaughtered for meat or sold, 
except when moles (male) are culled right after birth or due to old age. Females are more 
valuable alive since they provide milk, the main source of nutrition for the three tribes. 
Cattle are also a source of pride in these pastoral communities.  
B.  PASTORALIST RESOURCES: TRADITIONAL SOURCES OF 
CONFLICT 
1. Grazing 
Most of the cross-border conflicts in the Horn of Africa involve grazing land and 
water. The pastoral communities require these for their animals and agricultural practices. 
Watering points impact seasonal grazing patterns in the three districts of Pokot, Turkana, 
and Karamojong. Yet the provision of new water sources does not obviate the need for 
mobility to exploit the unpredictable distribution of grazing resources, and the 
introduction of new water sources in pastoral areas can have negative effects on 
rangeland—for instance, erosion due to over-concentration and overgrazing. Seasonal 
grazing patterns among each of these three communities involve leaving some areas un-
grazed for some time during the wet season so they can recover and provide grazing 
during the dry season. Any situating of new watering points that fails to customary 
practices into account can undermine existing patterns and result in permanent grazing 
throughout the year, which in turn results in overgrazing. Unfortunately, most new 
livestock watering points introduced since the colonial period have not been based on an 
understanding of dry-season grazing patterns or planned in consultation with customary 
authorities. 
What can be seen today is an expansion of agriculture in the more fertile areas 
such as Karenga in Dodoth–Karamojong, Kaputir–Turkana, Chepareria–Pokot which 
were previously dry-season grazing areas. This is due to the introduction of the ox plow 
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(Dyson Hudson, 1996:43) and the use of modern plowing technology in some areas. 
While this is beneficial to local communities or to some households in terms of increased 
agricultural production, it has meant a reduction in grazing land. A challenge lies in 
finding an effective balance between these two modes of land use. This has been elusive 
to date given the pre-occupation of state and development agencies with agriculture, to 
the exclusion of pastoralism.  
What also came to my attention is that some land perceived by local communities 
as “their” grazing land, like Marich in West Pokot District, is gazetted and protected as 
wildlife and forest reserves. The same applies to some Turkana and Karamojong land. 
Grazing, settlement, and cultivation are prohibited in these areas, although these 
restrictions are not enforced in all areas. This brings about what one local man called 
“shrinking rangeland under increased grazing pressure.” In other words, people are 
feeling the effects of having reduced grazing areas available to them while their herds 
grow (Mamdani et al., 1992). 
2. Water 
a. Rivers and Streams 
Rivers and streams form a major source of water for domestic use and 
livestock watering in the study area. The Turkwel, Suam, and Wei Wei rivers, along with 
many smaller ones, are the most important sources of water in the Pokot and the Turkana 
area. Likewise, the Kidepo valley in the Karamojong area is very handy to that 
community. Animals migrate to these riverbanks during dry spells, as most of the other 
rivers are seasonal.  
Both the Kenyan and Ugandan governments have strived to develop new 
water sources in order to reduce mobility and encourage settlement. Increasing 
availability of water is frequently perceived to be a simple technocratic solution to the 
problem of getting nomads to settle down. Not only is this thought necessary to help 




of the rationale for the construction of dams and valley tanks by the colonial government 
was to limit the need for herders to cross tribal boundaries. This view remains largely 
intact and should be encouraged by all concerned parties.  
In 1995, the President of Uganda issued a directive that the Karamojong 
and other nomadic tribes should remain within their district boundaries and the 
emergency rehabilitation of valley dams was planned to facilitate this (Watson, 1997, p. 
11). The aim was to mitigate the likelihood of clashes over water and grazing. For 
security purposes, it seems important to change the lifestyle of the communities and 
concentrate them as much a possible on agriculturally based farming, especially along the 
main rivers in the districts that have the potential for gravity irrigation. 
 
Figure 2.   This Pokot warrior was captured fetching water from a laggah (riverbed) for 
the livestock during the dry season. Retrieved November 5, 2007 from 
http://search.live.com/images/results.aspx?q=pokot+photo&mkt=en-us. 
 12
C. PASTORALIST RESOURCES: MODERN SOURCES OF CONFLICT 
The modern sources of conflict are twofold: land-tenure-related issues and 
watering points, both boreholes and irrigation. The challenges they present are extremely 
pronounced in northwestern Kenya and the Karamojong districts in eastern Uganda. 
Controversy over land dates back to the colonial demarcation of boundaries. With 
droughts and famines, ethnic groups trace their origins with a view to reclaiming what is 
perceived as ancestral land. The post– Kenyan-election crisis offered a vivid example as 
different groups sought to reassert traditional claims to land and oust interlopers. At the 
same time, livestock theft has been a major source of conflict in the region. A particular 
cause for concern is the demonstrated laxity by the government in addressing matters of 
importance, particularly when it involves cross- border movement.  
1. Land-Tenure Issues 
An appropriate land-tenure system is a particularly critical challenge for the 
sustainable management of livestock. Since most of the land in pastoralist areas is either 
trust land or group ranches, grazing land is held communally while stock management 
and ownership is individual in nature. Thus, individuals can only maximize their personal 
herds at the expense of the commons. This poses one of the biggest challenges to 
successful communal management of pastures, since there is no control on the size of 
individual herds. The community, under the auspices of the elders, sets aside varying 
amounts of reserved grazing. This usually takes the form of hills, and may cover many 
thousand hectares. The reserved grazing is used at the discretion of elders during the dry 
season or in drought years. It is important to note that traditional pasture-management 
techniques served the communities well in the past.  
With changing circumstances and a changing environment, traditional ways also 
need to be complemented with modern knowledge that will motivate pastoralists to 
engage in a more agro-based system of farming. The natural potential for livestock 
husbandry in the districts has been declining over time due to degradation correlated with 
heavy overgrazing and the erosion of communal resource management. This has 
increased the vulnerability of most herders while only benefiting a few.  
 13
2. Boreholes and Irrigation 
The people in these districts walk considerable distances in search of water during 
the periodic dry seasons when access to safe water for domestic and livestock use 
becomes a challenge. Some pans and dams built during colonial days are plagued by 
silting, breaching of embankments, poor maintenance of pumps, lack of fuel to run 
boreholes, and general underperformance of the facilities. Not many boreholes have been 
constructed since independence, but the available few are utilized for both livestock and 
home consumption. There is a de-silting program undertaken by the Ministry of Water 
Development, and by NGOs like the Arid Lands Resource Management Projects 
(ALRMP), and the Dutch NGO Schweizerische Normen-Vereinigung/(SNV) in the West 
Pokot and Turkana districts. 
I realized that borehole yields are typically very low, indicating that underground 
water is limited. Besides boreholes, Lake Turkana in Kenya is a key watering point that 
can boost the livelihood of communities in the region. The Karamojong almost 
exclusively depend on available boreholes as source of water. Some are classified as 
“range boreholes,” meaning they are kept locked during normal conditions and opened 
for livestock use only during severe drought periods. Flows fluctuate with the seasons, 
leaving few of the boreholes operational during the dry season. This may be due to the 
fact that most of the boreholes are quite shallow and, hence, subject to seasonal 
hydrological fluctuations; or there may be over-pumping due to high demand. This study 
also identified some semi-permanent, shallow wells in the Turkana and West Pokot 
districts in Kenya, mostly hand-scooped holes. The number of these is usually higher 




Figure 3.   The photo shows a pool shared by humans for drinking and livestock. 
Retrieved April 17, 2008 from http://www.fess.global.org/files/uganda-esaf-
full-re. 
 
3. Sand/Subsurface Dams and Infiltration Galleries 
Like many arid and semiarid regions of Africa, West Pokot, Turkana and the 
Karamojong districts are crisscrossed by several sand rivers, whose potential for 
floodwater harvesting and storage has not been fully tapped. Sand rivers are ephemeral 
water courses that remain dry most of the year, with the valley bottom being covered by 
sand (Nissen-Peterssen, 2000). However, sand rivers flood during the rainy season, and 
the flows may last from a few hours to several weeks. This flood flow can be stored in 
voids under the sand if a barrier such as a dam embankment or sand dam is constructed 
across the river. There are several sites throughout the area that favor good 
sand/subsurface dams. 
4. Emergency Water Tankering 
Tankering is the provision of water using water tankers from a source, usually 
several kilometers from the needy community, in periods of severe drought. In the West 
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Pokot and Turkana districts, emergency water tankering is available but limited, since it 
is expensive. Tankering could be encouraged to better utilize river and rain water in 
remote areas, as a short-term strategy. In sum, the key strategic challenges in managing 
water resources in these districts include correcting poor management of existing 
waterworks and repairing silted dams and pans, as well as boreholes that are closed down 
due to disrepair. Communities need to be empowered to manage existing waterworks for 
their animals and themselves responsibly. 
D.  THE TRIBES  
In the past, warriors from all three communities—Pokots, Turkana, and 
Karamojong—practiced the raiding of livestock as a means of acquiring status and to 
replace cattle lost through intertribal raids, drought, and epidemics (Ehrhart and Ayoo, 
2000). Cattle raids represent a case of a cultural practice that causes environmental 
degradation and conflict. The tribes’ perception of wealth is vested in the number of 
cattle an individual has and the belief that all cattle belong to him. This led people to keep 
more cattle than land and water resources could accommodate. Without careful 
communal coordination, such practices could cause overgrazing, land degradation, and 
conflicts in most of the study area. This in turn, precipitates further loss of cattle due to 
disease, as a result of inadequate water and pasture. To maintain large herds, the 
Karamojong in particular resorted to rustling cattle from neighboring communities. As 
the environment worsened, the Karamojong started to graze neighboring areas, especially 
in the Turkana and West Pokot districts in Kenya, as well as in Teso, Sebei, Bugishu, and 
Lango within Uganda, which resulted in more raiding and the displacement of host 
communities.  
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1. The Karamojong 
 
Figure 4.   Map of Karamojong District bordering the Turkana and West Pokot districts 




Karimoja District is located in the northeastern part of Uganda, with an area of 
27,200 square kilometers, mainly composed of semiarid savannah, bush, and mountains. 
To the east, the escarpment drops down into Turkana and West Pokot districts in Kenya; 
to the north is the Sudan; to the west and south are Ugandan districts populated by 
Acholi, Teso, and Sebei people. Among the Karamojong, dominant groups are the 
Dodoth in the north, the Jie in the central region, and in the south a cluster of closely 
related ethnic groups composed of Bokora, Matheniko, and Pian. In the southeast is the 
Upe subtribe believed to be a descendent of the Pokots of Kenya. The Karimoja District 
was one district up until 1971, when it was divided into the Kotido and Moroto districts. 
The Karamojong now live in five districts, since the government of Uganda created 
Abim, Kaabong and Nakapiripit in 2005 as additional districts. 
The people of this area get short rains during April and a longer rainy season from 
June to early September. This may not be consistent, which may lead to more drought 
and famine. Cereals like sorghum and millet are grown when the environment is 
favorable. The Karamojong people focus much attention on their herds of livestock. 
Competition for scarce resources, particularly water and pasture, and the high value 
placed on cattle have produced a culture of raiding and warfare within which men are 
noted for their bravery and livestock wealth. (Muhereza, E. F., 1995).  
Young men are encouraged to establish their reputations and generate wealth by 
mounting raids on other pastoral groups. The predominantly cattle-keeping groups who 
lead a more transhumant life include the Dodoth, Jie, Bokora, Pian, Pokot (Suk) and 
Matheniko. The Labwor are more of a settled agricultural community. 
Karamojong’s topography is characterized by high mountains rising between 
2000m and 3000m that border the Turkana escarpment on the Kenyan side. The 
settlements are concentrated in the central plains where crop cultivation is possible. Much 
of the soil is washed away in the drier, eastern areas by surface runoff, hence making the 
soils bare (Mamdani, M., P.M.B, Kosoma and A.B. Katende, 1992). 
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Figure 5.   Map of Kenya and Uganda showing the area of study. Retrieved March 3, 
2008 from http://www.bushdrum.com/news/districts_of_Kenya.php. 
 
Turkana District has been described as an inhospitable environment, since it is dry 
and hot year round (McCabe and Ellis, 1987). Its area is 77,000 sq km with a population 
of over 340,000 people. Lying within the Great East African Rift Valley, the district is 
bordered by chains of ridges and mountains to the west towards Uganda. In the east is 
Lake Turkana. The Pokot, Rendille and Samburu of Kenya live to the south. Predatory 
raids on livestock are a common means of survival. However, the Turkana have been 
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encouraged to fish and farm by aid agencies and the government as alternative means of 
survival. Irregularity of rainfall is a characteristic feature from year to year. The long 
rainfall is expected from March to May and short rains come towards the end of the year, 
with mountain ranges receiving the bulk of the rains. The district has a low population 
density with an average of 2.3 persons per square kilometer. The areas with little or no 
population are in the southern, southwestern, and northwestern sections bordering West 
Pokot District and the Sudan, respectively. About 40% of the population is found in and 
around settlements and irrigation schemes.  
The Turkana are the second most populous group of pastoralists in Kenya. These 
nomadic people dominate Turkana District. As is true for most of Kenya's pastoralists, 
there is little social structure to tie them down. They have learned to survive by taking 
advantage of every opportunity that comes their way, including expansion into non-
Turkana areas. Neighboring people include both herders and agriculturalists: El Molo, 
Samburu, Pokot, Rendille, Borana, and Endo-Marakwet. The Turkana have shown their 
openness to change by adapting to life in fishing communities, agricultural schemes, and 
in towns whenever possible. Like the Maasai, Turkana are known as fierce and vigilant 
guards in the cities. The Turkana language is close to the Toposa language and somewhat 
more distantly related to the Karamojong and Maasai groups. The Turkana themselves 
are ethnically related to the Karamojong.  
Livestock are central to the Turkana culture and all aspects of their social, 
political, and economic life revolve around them. Cattle, camels, sheep, and goats are 
vital to their lives and are the primary source of food (milk and meat). Livestock also 
play an important role in payment for bride wealth, compensation for crimes, fines for 
fathering illegitimate children, and as gifts on social occasions (Oba Gufu, 2001). 
The Turkana rely on several rivers, such as the Turkwel, Kerio and many other 
seasonal streams, for their livestock and daily use. When these rivers flood, new sediment 
and water extend onto the river plain, which is then cultivated. When the rivers dry up, 
open-pit wells are dug in the riverbed to be used for watering livestock and human 
consumption. There are few developed wells, and often families must travel several hours 
in search of water (Aemun E. Philip, 2006). 
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3. The Pokot  
West Pokot is one of the over twenty districts that make up the Rift Valley 
province of Kenya. It borders Uganda to the west, the Trans Nzoia and Marakwet 
districts to the south, the Turkana district to the north, and Baringo District to the 
southeast. The district has a total area of 9,100 square kilometers and stretches 132 
kilometers from north to south. The terrain is relatively rugged. Major topographic 
features include hills, dry plains, and rugged escarpments. Altitudes range from 900–
3000 meters, from the plains of Turkana in the northeast to the Cherangani hills in the 
southeastern part of the district. In the highest altitudes crop agriculture and livestock 
production are the major economic activities, while areas of lower altitude (1500–2100 
meters) have low rainfall and are predominantly pastoral. Rainfall is bimodal with the 
long rains falling between March and June and short rains between September and 
November. The major drainage systems in the district are the Turkwel, Kerio, and the 
Nzoia rivers. Both the Turkwel and Kerio rivers drain northwards into Lake Turkana 
while the Nzoia River drains into Lake Victoria in the south. The district is inhabited 
primarily by the Pokots and has a population of 396,000 people, with a density of 37 
persons per square kilometer. To indicate the district’s diversity, the cosmopolitan 
Kapenguria division has the highest population density, with about 210 persons per 
square kilometer, while Kasei division has the lowest at 10 persons per square kilometer.  
Traditionally, the Pokot are nomadic pastoralists whose lifestyle is rapidly 
changing to sedentary mixed farming, especially in areas where conditions permit. Like 
many other arid and semiarid areas in Kenya, this district has been experiencing rapid 
population growth for both humans and livestock. Physical infrastructure, such as roads, 
telecommunications, hospitals, and schools is poorly developed. The harsh climatic 
conditions over most of the area and difficult terrain make a large proportion of the 
district inaccessible. The sustainable utilization of natural resources in the district is 
hampered by a lack of socioeconomic and technical capacity. The greatest challenge is 
endemic poverty, a socioeconomic factor that has led to overutilization of natural 
resources in an attempt to meet basic needs. The willingness to adopt new water- 
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harvesting techniques, soil-conservation measures, irrigation, and cash-crop production to 
diversify sources of income is important to the district’s economic health, but is a 
challenge when these are at odds with traditional practices.  
The main livestock species found in the district in order of importance are cattle, 
goats, sheep, donkeys, camels, and poultry. There is, however, a gradual change in this 
order in response to population pressure, competition, and availability of pasture. 
Consequently, agro-pastoralism, is taking root with a marked increase in crop farming 
and horticulture along the riverbanks. Another discernible shift is the rising popularity of 
goats and camels in relation to cattle, in view of their tendency to browse rather than 
graze on the limited vegetation. Bulls, goats, and sheep are commonly sold to meet a 
household’s cash needs such as paying hospital bills, school fees, and food expenses. 
Poultry is also rising in popularity as women and youth, who are not traditionally allowed 
to own cattle, can easily sell chickens and eggs to raise money during periods of need. 
Insecurity is rampant in the district and often involves theft of livestock. Conflict 
over grazing resources is also common, in part due to the breakdown of traditional 
pasture-management systems and the increasing numbers of individual herds. Insecurity 
is often cross-border and makes sustainable utilization of livestock resources difficult. 
There have been recent attempts to reduce insecurity in the area through disarmament, 
but this is meeting stiff opposition from sections of the community, as will be discussed 
in a later chapter.  
Based on area and cultural differences, the Pokot people can be divided into two 
groups: the hill and the plains Pokot. The hill Pokots live in the rainy highlands in the 
west and central south of the Pokot area and practice both farming and pastoralism. The 
plains Pokot live on the dry and infertile plains and herd cows, goats, and sheep. This is 
the group that is involved in cattle raids and counter-raids with their Turkana and 
Karamojong neighbors.  
Pokot customs have much in common with those of the Turkana and Karamojong. 
Among all groups, wealth is measured by the number of cows one owns. Cows are used 
for barter, exchange, and most significantly as a form of bride wealth. A man is permitted 
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to marry more than one woman as long as he has sufficient cows to offer her family in 
exchange. This is the primary traditional way for wealth and resources to change hands in 
Pokot society.  
Due to their small territory the Pokot have remained the most ethnically cohesive 
of the three societies, and often their competition with the Turkana is as much about 
community survival as anything else. Most of the Pokot were made landless by the 
colonial administration and European settlers who pushed them off the most fertile land 
into the drier parts. To a large extent, therefore, cattle raiding by the Pokot are both a 
natural response to disasters such as drought and an attempt to increase their livestock in 
good seasons as insurance against bad seasons.  
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III. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CROSS-BORDER 
CONFLICTS 
The history of cross-border conflicts, raids, and counter-raids in northwestern 
Kenya and eastern Uganda dates back to the period when cattle-keeping people came in 
contact with long-distance traders. This was around the early 19th century, when 
pastoralists were the dominant force in East Africa. Today these communities are 
dominated, underprivileged, and impoverished (Van Zwanenberg and King, 1975, 
Chapter 1). For instance, the Karamojong of Uganda started trading with Egyptian and 
Abyssinian ivory traffickers and later Arab and Swahili traders in the late 1890s. These 
traders exchanged guns for ivory. The acquisition of firearms by the Karamojong enabled 
them to poach elephants and introduced a new dimension in the competition for scarce 
resources, leading to the development of a superior social organization. At the same time, 
the Turkana were also busy acquiring weapons from the marauding shifta bandits in 
Northern Kenya. 
A.  TRIBAL RELATIONS IN THE PRE-COLONIAL PERIOD 
The historical foundation of cross-border conflicts calls for the need to study the 
historic relations among the tribes in order to appreciate current social, economic, and 
political realities. Prior to the 18th century, the Turkana district was inhabited by a diverse 
group of pastoralists, including the Samburu and the Merille (then referred to as the 
Dassenech). The entry of the Turkana into the region occurred during the second half of 
the 18th century and continued through the middle of the 19th century. The Turkana, 
having separated from their brethren, the Jie-Karamojong (now in Uganda), expanded 
their territory in all directions, displacing the Toposa, the Dongiro, and the Dassanech in 
the north, the Dodoth and Karamojong in the west, the Pokot in the south, and the 
Samburu in the southeast. Displacement by the Turkana occurred over an extended 
period. Many but not all of the defeated groups were assimilated. According to P.H. 




possession of guns. Although stable relationships historically existed between different 
groups, these relationships fluctuated according to the degree of conflict over grazing and 
water resources, which still is the case today (Muller, 1989).  
For instance, the Ngikamatak clan who live in central Turkana district established 
symbiotic relationships with the Karamojong, which allowed them access to dry season 
grazing across the border with Uganda. In contrast to this arrangement, the Tarach clan in 
northwest Turkana not only have wet-season pastures in a drought-prone zone, but their 
traditional dry-season grazing lands are also along the border with Uganda—yet are 
insecure due to raids by the Dodoth sub-clan of Karamojong. They therefore use force to 
gain access to “their” dry-season rangelands.  
It is evident that these three sets of tribes have to move temporarily from one 
place to another to exploit key resource patches and that such mobility requires some 
resolution of land use and management conflicts between these groups. Traditionally 
these methods included raids and counter-raids or negotiations. Since the last century, 
however, patterns of land use have been slowly changing. After colonization, borders 
were fixed and access to key resources was curtailed. Worse, the Turkana tribal area was 
split between more than one political entity, which conflicted with indigenous resource-
use strategies. This meant that within the new fixed tribal boundaries, the environment 
was placed under even more severe pressure. 
During the pre-colonial period, livestock transactions served to maintain social 
interactions that cut across tribal boundaries and linked neighboring tribes. What were 
called “bond friendships” grew out of mutual economic interests between groups that 
lived near each other (Sobania, 1990). Such relationships were very beneficial in securing 
individual survival in the event of disasters such as raids, drought, and diseases. 
However, pauperization occurred whenever this system of reciprocity broke down.  
During the latter part of the 19th century, following a series of livestock 
epidemics, even wealthy stockowners were reduced to poverty. The worst-affected 
groups were forced to seek assistance from neighboring tribes. On occasion, the 
Karamojong went to seek food among the Pokot (Dietz, 1987), while the Turkana went 
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into the Dassenech country (Sobania, 1990), where the Dassenech allowed them to 
cultivate food. No individual kept all of his animals in one place, but always had some 
loaned to friends. The same arrangement is today still in place but has been disrupted by 
fixed borders. 
B.  TRIBAL RELATIONS IN THE COLONIAL PERIOD 
Colonial governments in Kenya and Uganda adopted policies that contributed to 
the economic and political marginalization of pastoral communities during colonial rule. 
The colonial governments favored the establishment of white settlers and a plantation 
economy at the expense of peasant production. Pastoralism was regarded by colonial 
officials as a primitive mode of production and efforts were made to discourage it (Galaty 
et al., 1980, pp. 184-186). One method the government used was to demarcate tribal 
reserves for African populations. This was aimed at making more fertile land available 
for alienation to white settlers. The creation of fixed borders did not only limit free access 
to grazing land and water, but also increased social conflict among the Africans. These 
borders hindered the free movement of people and livestock. The pastoralists were 
adversely affected by these measures since their mode of livelihood required nomadism. 
Colonialism further exacerbated political relations in the area because, as access to land 
shrank and populations of animals and people in restricted areas grew, competition for 
water and pasture between settlements became more acute. Restricting movement was a 
fatal decision that meant that when animals of one group died, the only way to replenish 
stocks was through raids (Ocan, n.d.. p. 9, Markakis, 1993).  
The colonial government also imposed market taxes, introduced quarantines, and 
engaged in de-stocking campaigns and other measures. These made border trade difficult 
and less profitable. By the mid 19th century, some of the communities in northern Kenya, 
such as the Turkana and the Pokot, had adopted transhumance, a settled form of 
pastoralism in which only animals are moved in search of pasture and water, while 
families remain in one area (Ocan, n.d., p. 4). Even these movements caused friction and 
hostilities between the Karamojong and their neighbors in Kenya over meager resources. 
Relationships invariably worsened during the dry season.  
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C.  TRIBAL RELATIONS IN THE POSTCOLONIAL PERIOD 
Land-use conflicts during the post-independence period in Kenya and Uganda 
have only worsened intertribal relations due to land-ownership issues. No endeavor has 
been made to revive colonial grazing schemes in the postcolonial period. Neither 
government had a clear range-management policy at the time of independence, while 
both also wished to avoid being associated with colonial repression of the indigenous 
population. For this among other reasons, border incursions continued unabated 
following independence in the early 1960s. Moreover, individual groups were allowed to 
make their own arrangements with their neighbors in regard to sharing pastures and 
watering points. The increased potential for friction as formerly restricted areas under 
government control were opened up led to an escalation of raids and counter-raids in the 
postcolonial period.  
Community interrelations worsened during the early 1970s, when hardly a week 
passed without a raid being reported to the authorities. This was the time when the 
Karamojong hit the Pokot and Turkana hard. Security forces had to be deployed along the 
Kenyan–Ugandan border. This became a major preoccupation and strained military 
resources, as will be discussed in Chapter IV. Raids and counter-raids resulted in 
enormous loss of livestock, leaving a large proportion of the pastoralists destitute. 
Because of poor security, large chunks of grazing lands were abandoned, while secure 
areas became over-used. For example, the Mosol and Simbol plains, bordering Turkana 
District to the southwest, had been used in the past by the Pokot as a wet-season grazing 
area. Following incursions of ngoroko (warriors) into the area, and subsequent raids 
which resulted in thousands of heads of cattle lost and many people killed, the Pokot 
ceased using the area in 1974 (Conants, 1982).  
One reason raids and counter-raids grew hard to control in the postcolonial period 
was that rustlers could cross international borders and then take refuge in their own 
countries, making pursuit by both security forces problematic, especially with the Pokot 
who live on both sides of the border (TDAR, 1979). Porous borders, coupled with poor 
security, only increased the potential for illegal activities and, in turn, suspicion led to 
distrust between the tribes and the security forces. This was the time also when the 
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Karamojong in Uganda broke into the Moroto army barracks, increasing the level of 
sophisticated weaponry available on the market (Soper, 1985). Arms from this cache 
found their way to the Karamojong, the Pokot, and the Turkana in Kenya.  
More arms also flowed following the fall of the government of Col. Mengistu 
Haile Mariam of Ethiopia in early 1990s. The secessionist war in southern Sudan has 
likewise injected more weapons into the region. As witnessed in the post– Kenyan-
election fighting (December 27, 2007), the availability of modern weapons is likely to 
exacerbate tribal conflicts in the region for a long time to come.  
1. Kenyan Government Policy 
In an attempt to deter raids among all tribes, the British had created a no man’s 
land along the international frontiers. Following the ratification of borders with Ethiopia, 
the British administration then embarked on policies that had profound ramifications for 
Turkana pastoralism. One policy was to prohibit Turkana from crossing international 
borders. Violators of these restrictions were punished by an instant fine of twenty per 
cent of the total number of livestock found trespassing (Lamphear, 1976). In spite of 
heavy fines imposed and patrolling of the borders by the army and the police, the 
Turkana, Pokots and other groups continued to transgress when grazing conditions 
proved inadequate in their territory. The prohibition on crossing borders seriously 
threatened Turkana pastoralism, based as it was on movements between wet-season 
grazing within Turkana territory and dry-season grazing that took them across 
international borders. The colonial government’s grazing policy for Turkana and pastoral 
communities around the 1940s was centered on providing additional water supplies to 
ensure a more even distribution of stock and to rest the areas around the permanent water 
points. This was achieved by vigorously enforcing grazing controls to avoid ecological 
degradation (TDAR, 1943). Water surveys were conducted throughout the affected 
districts and likely areas for development of water points were identified on the basis of 




pressure on overgrazed areas, ameliorate the people’s condition of life, and to keep 
people and livestock at a safe distance from the intertribal borders where raids were most 
common. Some of these initiatives continued for a short time after independence.  
2. Ugandan Government Policy 
During the pre-colonial period, land tenure and management were customary. 
There were a few variations from one community to another given differences among 
lineages vis-à-vis inheritance. As far as communal land was concerned, it was understood 
that this was for use by the whole community (Kisamba, 1992). Conflicts over grazing, 
water, and pasture land were very rare, if they occurred. Agro-based communities never 
bothered with title deeds since these were irrelevant to them. However, this changed 
when Uganda was declared a British protectorate in the 19th century and Ugandan 
kingdoms in the south entered into agreements with the British that paved the way for 
increased modification of land. From then through 1975, land became a source of tension. 
For instance, small tribes that were not represented well, like the Karamojong, were 
marginalized and pushed to the arid and semiarid areas of the country. This only fed local 
resentments.  
The Ugandan government policy since independence has been to establish 
development projects, especially in marginalized districts, to alleviate poverty and 
insecurity. Where people are considered to be a threat to the scarce natural resources, the 
policy of the government is to protect those resources. This was achieved most notably 
through the creation of forest reserves, national parks, and game reserves. Unfortunately, 
the gazetting of these game parks and reserves alienated the Karamojong who were 
restricted to specific areas, like the plains, against their wishes. The Karamojong also lost 
more land when the late Idi Amin created Moroto Army barracks and buffer zones in 
eastern Uganda (Mamdani, Kasoma and Katende, 1992). This forced the Karamojong to 
extend their movements miles beyond their traditional grazing areas along the border. 
Given frictions along the common border, the Ugandan government as early as 
the 1970s sought to impose a policy that restricted the Pokot and the Turkana pastoralist 
groups from entering Uganda without documentation from the relevant authorities. This 
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was meant to control raids and counter-raids as the tribes competed for resources in the 
dry seasons. However, any such controls have since been overtaken by events since East 
Africa Community states are in the process of liberalizing the issuance of common 
identification to allow free movement and trade between member states. What we could 
say, then, is that, the British were effective in controlling cross-border raids because they 
ran the government both in Kenya and Uganda. The necessary coordination and support 
could be achieved as required. The problem as both countries transitioned after 
independence is that they maintained sovereign border-non-interference policies based on 
prerogatives. 
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IV. THE SOCIAL- ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPACT OF 
THE CONFLICTS 
A.  SUFFERING OF THE PEOPLE 
Cross-border conflicts have led to the loss of many human lives and the 
displacement of various groups. The old, women, and children seem to bear the brunt of 
these socioeconomic and politically instigated forms of violence. According to the former 
UN secretary-general Layashi Yaker in 1994, about 80% of displaced people and 
refugees in Africa are women and children. Violations of the fundamental rights of 
women and girls are widespread in times of war and civil strife. These include crimes like 
rape, torture, murder, mistreatment, and neglect (Ayot, 1995). In the cases of Somalia, 
Northern Uganda, post-election Kenya (2007), and Darfur, women have been left in 
situations whereby they can hardly make ends meet, with little or no basic resources at 
their disposal. The acts of violence and lawlessness in the region do not permit NGO, 
civil, governmental, or community-based projects to be implemented. Groups live in 
constant fear of attack by raiders or bandits. The often-wanton destruction of life and 
property and the use of terror in all its manifestations tend to undermine people’s sense of 
value, dignity, and harmony. It should be noted that a climate of peace is a prerequisite 
for the respect and enjoyment of human rights, and for sustainable socioeconomic 
development. Northwestern Kenya, eastern Uganda, Somalia or Darfur should not be 
exceptions to this rule. 
Also worth noting is that when security forces fail in their operations against 
bandits, they often vent their anger on the civilian population, whom they accuse of 
colluding with the bandits. As punishment, the security forces often confiscate livestock 
to pressure the locals to return stolen cattle. This is followed by rape accusations and 
torture claims against the security forces by locals and by human-rights activists. On the 
other hand, the bandits may also heavily punish some members of the local populace who 
may be suspected of working as government informers. The local people therefore find 
themselves in jeopardy or are unsure of how to balance the two forces. Such scenarios 
often lead to victims running away and escaping from the reach of either group. 
 32
B.  BREAKDOWN OF THE SOCIAL ORDER 
The colonial authority’s preoccupation with pacifying the people led them to 
neglect any meaningful investment in social or economic development in either Kenya or 
Uganda. Unfortunately, traditional reasons for raids and counter-raids survived the test of 
time over the last several decades and marginalized communities adapted them to a new 
strategy. There has been a shift from the old attitude of raids as being game like to using 
them in sophisticated new ways to generate money. The main reason behind this is 
socioeconomic. With limited access to market and poor infrastructure leaves the means to 
market livestock limited throughout the region. Collapse of traditional range-management 
practices and growing pressure on available pasture is likewise increasingly interfering 
with traditional practices of seasonal pastoral movement of livestock that previously 
helped conserve pasture. The targeting of noncombatant women, children, and the elderly 
is one reflection of the breakdown of the entire social order.  
The author of this thesis found out that the youth are structurally available, ready 
for mobilization, and are thirsty to work for the highest bidder. According to one Mr. 
Wero Karass, “the risks are more than the benefits but they better take it to make ends 
meet.” Youth who feel most excluded from the social, economic, and political order of 
the society are submissive and easily manipulated. Their appropriation for violence by 
others has had a serious effect on the traditional hierarchy in pastoralist society. 
Traditionally elders were expected to have some moderating influence over the activities 
of the most aggressive youth, but they no longer seem to have that control. 
In Kenya, the issue of social disorder started when the former President, Mr. 
Daniel Arap Moi, assumed office in 1978. The KAMATUSA (Kalenjin, Masai, Turkana, 
and Samburu tribes) expected political change in terms of gaining a greater share of 
government resources. When this did not happen, it particularly upset the Pokot and 
Turkana, given their loyalty to the government up until then. To date, they do not feel 
they have received sufficient economic and political dispensation. This has led them to 
try to survive by taking a new approach to banditry and cattle rustling in northwestern 
Kenya. This is now further perpetrated by warlords or businessmen with political support. 
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For instance, the marginalized Pokot and the Turkana of Kenya are reasserting 
their historical claims to the fertile lands of Trans-Nzoia District. Historically, this district 
formed part of the Kenyan White Highlands, and the two tribes claim that they were 
displaced from there to worse areas that can not support them either agriculturally or in 
terms of livestock. Following independence in 1963, the highlands were opened to all 
racial groups. Thus, a number of prominent African politicians, businessmen, and civil 
servants acquired huge tracts of land from the former European owners under 
government-sponsored “willing buyer and willing seller” agreements. However, nearly 
all the new landowners are non-Pokot, which makes the Pokots and the Turkana feel even 
more disenfranchised. It is worth noting that at the time of independence, most of the 
Pokot or their Turkana neighbors had not been exposed to Western education and 
influence and thus had not yet realized the value of acquiring agricultural land. In the last 
twenty years, the Kenyan government has been subdividing state farms in Trans-Nzoia 
District. These have gone to politically favored and well-connected individuals, primarily 
Tugen and Keiyo, at the expense of the many landless locals.  
Economically, Pokot, Turkana, and Karamojong districts are underdeveloped in 
terms of infrastructure, resource allocation, and the availability of economic and social 
services. Tribes in these districts feel that they have been pushed to the wall and must 
react in one form or another to reassert and safeguard their interests and make the 
government accede to their various demands.  
Tribal clashes in 1992, 1997, and 2007 have pitted one community against 
another in Kenya and caused a lot of social disorder in the country. In 1992, when the 
multiparty system was introduced, a total of about 2,500 people, the majority of whom 
were women and children, were killed in ethnic clashes (Amnesty International 1993, 
Daily Nation March 20; June 6, 1992). The 1997 clashes also saw hundreds of people 
killed, mainly in the Rift Valley and Coast provinces. Thousands were displaced and 
hundreds of homes were destroyed and property worth millions of shillings was looted. It 
is alleged that the perpetrators of these attacks had given special training to Kalenjin 
youth (warriors) who were later sent to various parts of the country to spearhead the 
ethnic violence which involved the stealing or maiming of livestock, burning of food 
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crops and houses, raping of women, and selective killing of people. The aim of the ethnic 
clashes was to punish any community that was perceived by the government as the 
opposition, and vice versa. The recent post-election Kenyan crisis has been incomparably 
worse.  
C.  ECONOMIC HARDSHIP 
The 1980s happened to be a period characterized by droughts and famines. It is 
not a coincidence that raids grew, bringing about massive looting of livestock and 
destruction of property. The Pokot and the Turkana lost more than 80% of their livestock 
during this period. By February 1982, about 50% of the Turkana population (180,000) 
were in refugee camps and depended on relief supplies (Markakis 1993:146). Most 
people were in a state of despair. Even today Pokots and the Turkana have not recovered 
from such heavy stock losses. Thus, social and economic differentiation has become 
more pronounced. In most cases, the displaced and impoverished pastoralists have been 
forced to resort to selling firewood and charcoal, or offering themselves as farm laborers, 
both of which are regarded as degrading activities by pastoral groups. According to Salih 
(1992) the communities are left with no options of survival and have little choice but to 
continue to try to exploit key environmental resources to provide food and income for 
survival. 
D.  POLITICAL MANIPULATION 
The phenomenon of livestock warlords and political manipulation is rampant in 
the Horn of Africa, especially in the drier areas. Politicians have taken advantage of 
poverty and the ignorance of the electorate to influence them to fight each other. A 
particular community is made to perceive or believe that others are its enemies, thus 
causing hatred, tension, and frequent conflicts in the region. At present the warlords 
appear to be wealthiest among the Somali, Turkana, Pokot and Karamojong. In some 
areas they control all aspects of social and economic life and even the political orientation 
of the people. 
In a sense, the warlords have become sources of assistance, particularly to 
illiterate people, and act as a law unto themselves. What is worse is that that the warlords 
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command small and well-equipped armies with more sophisticated weapons than those 
that government security forces have at their disposal. The state of insecurity and 
lawlessness in northwestern Kenya and the Karamojong region, in turn, further contribute 
to the collapse of social and economic structures and encourage communities to result to 
organized militias who themselves then conduct raids.  
In Kenya, the Pokot have raided the Sengwer, Turkana, Tugen, Marakwet, 
Sabaot, Luhya and the Keiyo. Internationally, they have raided the Karamajong and Sebei 
of Uganda, while the Turkana raid the Toposa of Ethiopia. The lack of control over 
extensive porous borders complicates the scenario. Available evidence shows that the 
first warlord emerged in West Pokot in the 1980s. He mobilized a group of idle youths in 
the district by promising livestock. These young men underwent some vigorous military 
training under the supervision of ex-members of the security forces and were under the 
command of an individual popularly known as “General” Mauwa, who was later put in 
jail. 
After undergoing their training, the warriors were sent on raiding missions against 
neighbors in Kenya, as well as Uganda and Sudan. Most of their raids yielded success in 
the form of livestock, although there were also some casualties during combat. Ever since 
these auspicious beginnings, raids have turned into a profitable commercial venture for 
both warlords and their retainers. Due to people’s disillusionment and anger over the 
government’s neglect of them, the warlords have managed to win strong local support, 
including from politicians. Thus the warlords, with the support of politicians, maintain, 
supervise, and become the final authority on the cattle “trade,” overriding the traditional 
powers that elders used to have. Available evidence shows that there are links between 
warlords and livestock traders from Kenya and neighboring countries, particularly the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), (Daniel Yemuk, interview, 2007). The raids and 
counter-raids have become increasingly militarized and sophisticated.  
E.  RAIDS 
One thing that has assisted raiding and counter-raiding as a business enterprise is 
small-arms trafficking. This has become one of the biggest scourges in the Horn of 
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Africa. In reaction to the rise in violence and lawlessness, the villagers themselves are 
now saving money to buy guns illegally for self-defense. The perception here is that the 
only protection against an assault rifle is another assault rifle. The communities have lost 
faith in the ability of their own traditional security arrangements to protect them. Lacking 
resources, fearing loss of life and limb, and corrupted by the impact of cross-border 
smuggling networks, local authorities are hampered from increasing the protection they 
should provide along the border. Meanwhile, violence has fostered distrust among the 
people in the area, imperiling the maintenance of traditional conflict-resolution customs 
among clans and tribes.  
In the longstanding cross-border conflict areas between Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya 
and Uganda, guns have been responsible for turning the traditional communal activities 
of pastoral societies into deadly confrontations. The rustlers seem to be succeeding in 
carrying out raids and counter-raids because there is no government control in some 
areas. The source of the arms is likely to be from neighboring countries like Sudan, 
Ethiopia, even as far away as Somalia, and Eastern Europe.  
The raids and counter-raids among the Pokots, Turkana and Karamojong tribal 
groups have become polarized into never-ending rivalries that, for example, pit  
• The Turkana against the Pokot  
• The Pokot against the Karamojong  
• The Turkana against the Karamojong  
In the recent past, numerous incidents have been reported of cattle theft, people 
being killed or injured, and others being displaced as a result of intra- and interstate 
cross-border conflicts among the three tribal communities. The battle zones are Amudat, 
the area south of Moroto around Kanyangaren River, Loro, Katikekile, Kainuk, and other 
areas where the communities converge for water. The nomadic Pokot who live along the 
Kenya and Uganda border have extended their raiding to the Sengwer, the Luhyas, the 
Marakwet, and the Sabaots of the Trans Nzoia district of Kenya. 
In Uganda, the Karamojong tensions or conflicts started between cattle keepers 
and grew to include other local non-pastoral resource users. It later spread within and 
beyond the communities under study, into Sudan. In the past, raids led to cyclical 
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violence because whenever one Karamojong group raided another, the aggrieved group 
would mobilize its allies, including those from as far away as Sudan and Kenya, to stage 
a counter-raid. The Dodoth-Karamojong, for example, is in alliance with the Turkana and 
they team up to undertake raiding activities among the Bokora, Pian, Labwor (who are 
Karamojong of Uganda), and into neighboring districts, while the Jie are sometimes in 
alliance with the Toposa and together raid the Turkana.  
When resources are depleted and the herds need to be moved, this is done by 
heavily armed warrior groups. Historically, the warriors wielded spears and may have 
had a few homemade guns. Over the years, the majority of these warriors have since 
acquired modern automatic and semiautomatic rifles as spoils from the civil wars that 
have engulfed the region for several decades now. These weapons have turned been 
against the unarmed populations like the Sengwer and the Luhya in Kenya wherever they 
carry out their own dry-season grazing. Acts of lawlessness committed by armed cattle 
keepers include highway robberies along the Kapenguria–Lodwar–Sudan road, cattle 
rustling in the neighboring districts, and the rape of women and senseless killing of 
innocent people. Poaching also has been a problem. Armed Kenyan Pokots, who 
ostensibly cross into Uganda during the dry season to graze and water their animals, are 
accused of illegally hunting and indiscriminately killing wild animals in Kapchorwa, 
Uganda. 
F.  STRAIN ON MILITARY AND SECURITY SERVICES 
The governments of Kenya and Uganda have been engaged in measures to try to 
restore law and order within the conflict areas of Pokot, Turkana and Karamojong. 
However, the governments seem not to have realized early enough the need to normalize 
the security situation. Consequently, the bad guys have grown so strong that they can 
effectively counter the government forces. For instance, bandits shot down a military 
helicopter in December 1996, which was carrying the Samburu district commissioner, 
Mr. Henry Nyandoro, and other district security personnel who were trying to conduct 
aerial surveillance of the raiders’ movements. An alleged Pokot warlord used a bazooka 
to shot down the helicopter (Daily Nation December 28-31, 1996; The East African 
 38
Standard December 28-31, 1996). In addition, the bandits were said to possess 
sophisticated weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades and launchers, landmines, 
machine guns, and an assortment of other weapons. This illustrates the problem, as these 
events date to over ten years ago. Given the bandits’ sophistication, the security forces 
are often hesitant to pursue them into their hideouts since they have learnt through 
experience that this might be suicidal.  
Again, in February 1998, raiders from Pokot launched one of the bloodiest raids 
in living memory against their neighbors, the Marakwet (Daily Nation 13 February 
1998). Thousands of people were killed or displaced; thousands of livestock were stolen; 
houses, stores, and farms were burned down; and women were raped. The Marakwet 
leaders reacted angrily to the mayhem caused by the Pokot, putting the blame entirely on 
the government for complicity in the attack. Thousands of security forces were deployed 
to the area to quell the violence and to bring the situation under control, but without much 
success. Two months later, the government sent a battalion of military men, heavily 
armed with sophisticated weapons including helicopter gunships, to support the police 
and try to flush out the bandits. However, this mission also did not achieve much due to 
the strain placed on military logistics and an outcry from sympathizers within 
communities. Again, the bandits were smarter regarding their environment and seem to 
have been well trained in escape and evasion tactics and in how to coordinate their 
operations. A study carried out by KDOD and other security agencies revealed that some 
of the raiders and troublemakers in both regions are former security men who are out for 
revenge for alleged dismissal from the services. 
The last joint military operation involving Kenya and Uganda was to undertake 
disarmament in the North Rift districts of Samburu, Marakwet, Baringo, Turkana, and 
West Pokot of Kenya and the Karamojong area of Uganda. This was done between 2004 
and 2006. The Kenya government is currently disarming the Sabaot Land Defense Forces 
(SLDF) with the assistance of the Ugandan government. The Ugandan People’s Defense 
Forces (UPDF) is also disarming the Karamojong separately. These operations have 
always drawn a lot of opposition from locals, local politicians, NGOs, and human-rights 
activists. For instance, the 2004–2006 operation had to be called off once it proved to be  
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straining the military in terms of time and resources. It yielded minimal results in terms 
of weapons recovered, especially because it called for voluntary disarmament as opposed 
to forced operations which employ cordon and search tactics.  
The governments of both Kenya and Uganda appear to be losing effective control 
over raiders who cross the border. The raiders are perceived to be very familiar with the 
rugged terrain and the hostile environment in which they operate, unlike the militaries of 
either country. As Markakis (1993, p. 13) argued in 1993, a number of pastoral societies 
were already growing more militarized and were increasingly relying on firearms. Thus, 
conflicts among pastoralists were taking on new and exaggerated dimensions. This he 
attributed to a shrinking resource base, which was provoking a desperate struggle for 
survival in which some groups felt their very existence was being threatened. This 
struggle continues and has been waged using even newer and more sophisticated 
firearms, which hardly spares noncombatants. The government’s will to fight and instill 
confidence to the people may be there in theory, but in practice the resource constraints 
or strains on military and law-enforcement agencies are a major drawback, especially 
given the extensiveness of the area to be covered and the limited budget allocations to the 
security dockets. 
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V.  DETERRENCE MEASURES 
The governments of the republics of Uganda and Kenya since the postcolonial 
period have held consultative meetings at the strategic level and down through the 
provincial administrations on possible deterrence measures to protect the pastoral 
communities who occupy the semiarid areas of both countries. The main problem is 
competition for natural resources—water and pasture (grazing areas)—and disputed land 
areas. The two countries have adopted approaches in the past extending into the present 
with the ultimate mission of securing and sensitizing their communities against raids and 
counter- raids. This chapter will discuss the approaches, lessons learned, successes, and 
failures that have been encountered in this process. 
A. PAST APPROACHES 
Several attempts or efforts toward regional approaches to deter or contain armed 
pastoralist conflicts in the Horn of Africa have been made in the past, but have yielded 
few results or have failed for one reason or another. For instance, the approach used by 
the British both in Kenya and Uganda was to restrict or control the movement of the 
pastoral communities within designated borders or areas reserved for that purpose 
(Barber, 1968; Muller, 1989).  
1. Branding 
Livestock branding is a means of identifying stolen livestock from a particular 
community. It was introduced after independence in both countries, though it has not 
been consistently done or enforced. Each region is given a particular mark and it this is 
used to mark cattle by the Ministry of Livestock, which is also supposed to keep records 
for ease of reference. Ideally, brands not only help the government, but Good Samaritans 
realize when livestock do not belong to a particular region because of the marks 
displayed. Security- conscious citizen should react by reporting errant livestock to their 
elders, the local administration, or to the nearest police station, if one exists in the 
neighborhood. The Kenyan government implemented this policy among pastoral 
communities in its northwestern districts. The system works well and is being encouraged 
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and supported by peace initiatives and agencies operating in the region. The government 
of Uganda has followed suit in Karamojong region so that any cattle that may be stolen 
from either side of the border can be recovered by security personnel. Government 
officials routinely raise the issue of branding livestock in pastoral conflict areas during 
cross-border commission conferences. However, while the theory behind branding and 
identification is certainly sound, without sustained community and law-enforcement 
support this system can’t work effectively.  
2. Outpost Security Post or Military Detachments  
In their efforts to halt the insecurity menace, both national governments have 
established temporary police and military detachments to serve as forward quick-reaction 
forces. This was started immediately after independence because of cross-border tensions 
and incursions between Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Uganda. For instance, the Kenya 
government established military detachments in Northeastern Province because of the 
Shifta War with Somalia in 1967. Meanwhile, the Ugandan government set up Moroto 
barracks along the Kenyan–Ugandan border during Amin’s regime. To counter this, the 
Kenyan government then formed a permanent military base in Eldoret and temporary 
forward bases along Kenya’s borders with Uganda and Sudan. Such bases represent a 
response to both local and international security threats. Indeed, there were numerous 
security uncertainties between Kenya and Uganda during President Idi Amin “Dada’s” 
reign in the 1970s. During this period, Uganda claimed part of Kenya up to Naivasha 
town, which is 90 kilometers away from Nairobi, the capital city. The presence of 
security forces in locations along major roads acted as a deterrent because the forces 
could conduct robust patrols and warn away raiders and any external threats. However, 
this did not yield permanent results since clever raiders from both sides learned the 
security forces’ routines or standard operating procedures and intensified their raids 
elsewhere. Also, both governments’ forces were overstretched in terms of their area of 
coverage, porous borders, logistics, personnel, and other demanding military tasks.  
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3. Political Approach and Corruption 
The governments of Kenya and Uganda have tried to use politicians to help 
convince pastoral communities to stop raids and counter-raids and pursue other means of 
livelihood. Such efforts have worked reasonably where environmental factors favor other 
means of livelihood. However, some local leaders in northwestern Kenya and some 
Karamojong leaders in Uganda have been accused of politicking at the expense of the 
people. The perception that some politicians do not want disarmament itself helps 
frustrate government efforts in the region. Politicians’ belief that asking people to 
surrender their guns will make them lose votes in an election is a hindrance to genuine 
peace initiatives. These same politicians have likewise been accused of corruption and 
mismanagement of donor development funds. Often community projects exist on paper, 
yet not on the ground. 
B. HOME GUARDS AND VIGILANTE GROUPS  
1. Karimoja District 
Before independence, the governments in Kampala and Nairobi deployed home 
guards and vigilante groups. The program in Uganda involved recruiting former 
Karamojong warriors into the service of the state. Warriors who volunteered to register 
their guns with the state were given a monthly salary of $10-$20 as an incentive. After 
being registered, the warriors were permitted to keep their guns and were given uniforms, 
as well as some basic military training. This scheme was reinitiated in 1995 and had, 
before the end of 1996, a registered force of 8,000 home guards.  
The duties of these home guards are to: 
• Track down stolen animals and the errant warriors responsible for raids  
• Watch, listen, and patrol along the existing roads and pass any information 
to chiefs, elders, or security forces.  
• Try to convince other cattle raiders to change their way of life and 
encourage them to register their guns and join the group.  
The plan in Karimoja was to have volunteers from every village (manyatta) so 
that the overall team looks representative and provides the basis for actual reconciliation 
between warring ethnic groups. As a result of this program, raiding activities diminished 
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after 1995 to small-time criminal activities. Law enforcement with respect to illegal gun 
use improved and criminals were prosecuted and their guns confiscated. Raided animals 
and looted properties were recovered and returned to their rightful owners (Muhereza, E. 
F and Ocan, C., 1994). 
2. Home Guards in West Pokot and Turkana Districts 
The use of home guard groups in Kenya dates back to the 1950s, when the 
government recognized that most Kikuyu were ready and willing to take up arms to 
defend themselves against Mau Mau insurgents. Members of the home guards were 
unpaid. No uniforms were provided and individuals were armed with crude edged 
weapons only. Nevertheless, the guards undertook a variety of missions. Most of the time 
they guarded fortified villages that had been set up to protect the Kikuyu from the Mau 
Mau. They also conducted limited patrols to prevent the Mau Mau from overrunning 
protected areas. Once the guards started to demonstrate some military reliability, the 
government supplied shotguns and rifles to them so that they could better fulfill their 
duties.  
Then came the post-independence period, when raids and conflicts among 
pastoral communities grew rampant. The government started recruiting and deploying 
these guards in remote and inaccessible regions like Turkana and West Pokot to deter 
raids. Locals were recruited for the simple reason that they had the advantage of knowing 
the terrain and the people. In fact, they could—or can—tell who the thieves are and did a 
good job of recovering stolen animals. The government had to vet and issue those 
selected with rifles. In most cases, these guards worked under the supervision of the chief 
or reported to the nearest police station. They were not on the government payroll, but 
were give incentives like food for work. This made them very effective. Their roles are 
similar to those of the Karamojong of Uganda. However, increasingly today, the home 
guards are overwhelmed by the tactics and the firepower used by raiders. Latest reports 




The Kenyan government conducted a disarmament operation, code-named 
“Ngundo,” in West Pokot District in 1984 after the Pokots terrorized non-Pokots and 
neighboring tribes across the international border. Over 2,500 guns were recovered. 
Nevertherless, most of the locals escaped to Uganda with quite a large number of their 
arms compared to those recovered. The Ugandan government did not provide sufficient 
assistance at the time. The Kenyan government expected the Ugandans to block the 
border and arrest the fleeing Pokots or allow Kenyan military helicopter gunships to cross 
the borders in pursuit of the Pokot.  
Another voluntary disarmament was conducted between 2004 and 2006 and about 
2,298 assorted arms and 4,816 rounds were recovered. In contrast to the Pokot, the 
Turkana were not disarmed because of the risk of exposing them to attacks from Toposa 
and Karamojong. At this time, the Turkana were not causing as many problems internally 
in Kenya. In January 2001, the Uganda Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF) undertook a 
similar operation against the Karamojong. An estimated 14,000 guns were recovered as a 
result of a combined strategy of voluntary and forced disarmament. A second voluntary 
disarmament was undertaken in 2002, but did not last long because of other security tasks 
in the country. During this phase over 10,000 guns were recovered. The third phase was 
launched in 2004 with an estimated 4,500 guns recovered. Between July 2006 and May 
2007, a total of 2,951 guns were recovered through forced disarmament, with 57 rifles 
being voluntarily surrendered. This time the Karamojong were reluctant to surrender their 
rifles. This forced the UPDF to engage in forced disarmament operations, like cordon and 
search operations (Karuhanga James, November 13, 2006). 
Locals and human-rights groups condemned these more recent operations, 
claiming that they targeted innocent citizens. The disarmament did not last long due to 
the Ugandan government’s ongoing campaign against the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA), a factor in Northern Uganda and in Southern Sudan. Meanwhile, the unilateral 
and Uganda-only disarmament of the Karamojong immediately exposed them to their 
perennial Pokot and Turkana enemies. This led the Lord’s Resistance Army and 
Karamojong elite to complain to the government that they were being exposed to their 
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armed neighbors and that they needed the state to provide them with basic security. The 
Karamojong went ahead and, in order to be able to defend themselves, rearmed. Even so, 
according to the UPDF Third Division commander, Brig. Patrick Kankiriho, so far the 
disarmament exercise in Karamoja has reduced cross-border rustling. The Moroto 
regional district commissioner (RDC), Nahaman Ojwe, wants the Kenya government to 
similarly disarm the Pokot and Turkana tribes to quicken the process in Karamoja. The 
district commissioner was quoted as saying, “The Karimojong warriors still have the fear 
that in case they totally surrender their guns to the UPDF, the Kenya Pokot will easily 
attack them. So it is not good for our people to disarm while the Pokots do not disarm” 
(The New Vision, 4 April 2008, Edyegu, Daniel).  
Currently, the Kenya government is disarming the Sabaot Land Defense Forces 
(SLDF) in Mt Elgon District which borders West Pokot district and Uganda. The SLDF 
militia group has been terrorizing people for the past two and half years over land related 
issues. It has been reported that over 600 people have been killed, over 6,000 displaced, 
and property worth millions of shillings looted and homes burnt down by this militia 
group fighting for perceived land rights (BBC Africa, April 6, 2008). As of the time of 
this writing, Operation Okoa Maisha had recovered or captured 33 rifles, 205 assorted 
rounds of ammunition, and four grenades (KDOD, 2008). 
4. Civilian-Based Organizations (CBO), Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGO), and Community-Based Initiatives (CBO) 
There are several initiatives by the local communities themselves working closely 
with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil-society organizations (CBOs). 
They have done considerable work in the semiarid areas in the Horn of Africa, such as 
sinking boreholes, providing veterinary services, and constructing health centers and 
schools. Attitudes towards them have largely been positive. “They have a sense of humor 
and are sympathetic to situations,” noted one church elder in an interview. Local elites 
and church organizations at the grassroots level are instrumental in teaming up to sponsor 
locally initiated projects to provide the necessary stable conditions for the delivery of 
services. In most cases they help fill the security vacuum in remote border regions. Local 
communities seem to have more faith in them than in government since they provide 
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space for dialogue and understand local needs. For instance, peace initiatives like the 
Tecla Lorupe Foundation (TLPF) and the World Bank funded the Arid and Semiarid 
Lands Resource-Management Program (ALRMP) operating in the pastoral regions of 
Kenya and Uganda and doing a commendable job. District peace committees also have 
played a pivotal role in providing an interface between local administration, elders, and 
civil-society organizations, despite limited support from government. However, as Dave 
Eaton argues in his article, “The Business of Peace: Raiding and Peacework along the 
Kenyan–Ugandan border (Part II),” there are two types of peace initiative in the 
northwestern region, especially in the West Pokot and Turkana districts. One type is 
genuine. The second benefits money-making groups of NGOs who seek donor funds 
without any real sense of what the people want. Politicians themselves seem to fall into 
this latter category and the warriors do not even trust them any more.  
C. LESSONS LEARNED 
1. Timeliness and Effective Response 
Efforts to prevent or manage conflicts have the greatest chance of success if 
potential trouble spots are identified and addressed at an early stage. There is a need to 
develop both early and effective mechanisms for preventing violence and conflict and to 
identify trends and patterns of any conflict before implementing any plan. Delayed and 
ineffective action exacerbates conflict by accelerating the intensification or territorial 
spread of violence. Hence, timeliness in the dissemination of information to decision 
makers is very important for prompt action. 
2. Ownership as a Principle of Deterring Conflicts 
The parties to conflicts have the primary responsibility for conflict prevention, 
mitigation, and response in their localities. This is because the people concerned have the 
knowledge, history, and local interrelations necessary for the eventual transformation of 
the conflict. All interventions that aim to deter should use approaches that ensure that 
parties to the conflict take effective ownership of the process and its outcomes via 
dialogue. By harnessing the energy of local networks and fostering local ownership to  
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drive conflict mitigation approaches in cross-border areas, there is the strong possibility 
of future sustainability and replication. This means it is necessary to develop the 
necessary means for cross-border dialogue.  
The conflicts in these areas are dynamic, interlinked, and tend to span ethnic and 
state boundaries. They constitute a system of relationships. As noted in the previous 
chapters, the nature of these relationships dictate that any conflict is likely to involve 
more parties than those directly involved in incidents of violence and conflict. The 
deterrence measures put in place must be responsive to changes in relationship and to 
changing situations. 
3. Engagement of the Right Actors 
Given that most problems that lead to violent conflicts cannot be resolved 
overnight, a longer-term approach to peace and security is important. Linear progress 
can’t be expected. Rather, sustained engagement involves many different interventions at 
various times and levels. Equally crucial in ensuring that sustainable outcomes to conflict 
are achieved is to engage the right actors. One of the major causes of the prolongation of 
a conflict is the exclusion of a segment of the population from decision-making 
processes. Thus, including the right people in all phases of dialogue can make a 
significant contribution to building peace. Deterrence measures should thus more 
extensively involve actors at a number of different levels and should include civil-society 
groups, state institutions, local communities, and the traditional networks and social 
structures in each community or group.  
4. Coordination and Partnership 
The need for effective local cross-border coordination and cooperation efforts is 
generally recognized and undisputed by those on both sides of the border. Coordination 
promotes the leveraging of resources and efforts and it promotes efficiency. In addition, 
deterrence measures are sustainable when there is an institutional framework which 




easier and response is faster when there are corresponding civil-society networks and 
structures on either side of the border. Close government participation, physical presence, 
and leadership are paramount in resolving any cross-border issues. 
When traveling through the region, it is not hard to understand why government 
commitment and response to security remain inadequate. The terrain is rugged and 
complex which means initiatives need to be locally tailored and better coordinated.  
D. PRESENT APPROACHES 
The IGAD member states are establishing the Conflict Early Warning Mechanism 
(CEWARN) which is intended to provide information about impending raids and related 
movements. However, the mechanism is still in its initial stages of implementation. 
Efforts are also being discussed in the realms of joint disarmament, political approaches, 
community policing, and education. All will be further elaborated on in the next chapter. 
1.  Successes and Failures 
a. Successes: Kenya–Uganda 
• Traditional authorities, particularly elders, are now increasingly involved 
in reporting or responding to crimes like rape, murder, stock raiding, and 
assaults. They provide information to the police under the newly 
introduced community-policing project, and joint efforts with the police 
are increasingly believed to work. In part that is because security forces in 
these arid districts are more disposed than before to consult and liaise with 
elders and communities. The element of increased speed and commitment 
by the police in collaboration with the elders and the local leaders is very 
encouraging.  
• The administration has played a role in actively supporting and enforcing 
the customary approach of forced confiscation of stock. Authorities hold a 
culprit in custody until some kind of compensation is paid. Then the 
victim is released with conditions.  
• There has, likewise, been a shift to collective responsibility for security 
among elders, councilors, and chiefs of an area. Where banditry or raids 
occur, the relevant chiefs and elders are expected to deliver the guns used 
in the incident and return stock, or face confiscation of livestock from the 




among pastoralist communities. It not only discourages raids and counter-
raids, but spoils the reputation of a leader whose community stole from 
another. 
b. Failures  
Despite these successes, deterrence measures remain the major challenge 
presented by networks of cross-border actors. The problem comes when governments fail 
to incorporate all warring parties in conflict management, especially when they ignore the 
established social structures within the communities to deter conflicts. In this case, the 
excluded community feels neglected or marginalized and reacts violently. According to 
one interviewee who happened to be a Pokot (Mr. Daniel Yemuk), “Peace with the 
Karamojong is not enough without peace with the Toposa of Sudan, the Turkana and the 
Sebei of Uganda.”  
Too minimal a presence by government officials or social workers is a 
further source of insecurity and failure. Most administrative offices lack officers and 
adequate security personnel. Another failure is the repeated promise of water for both 
livestock and humans. People tend to lose patience with empty promises, particularly 
women who must go long distances in search of water.  
Incidents like rape are also likely to jeopardize fragile deterrence 
measures. The ineffective recovery and timely return of stolen stock, coupled with weak 
early warning and response capacity, constitute further failures from the perspective of 
affected communities. Inadequate communication networks make deterrence measures 
difficult to enforce. Just imagine an environment that lacks communication, where 
mobile phones and television are rare, radios and internet connectivity are nonexistent, 
and road networks are definitely poor. The rainy season renders all of this worse and is 
another factor that retards development. The task of disarmament is further complicated 
by the sheer number of arms available and the bottomless supply given the porous nature 
of the borders. Lack of employment, insufficient education, and the traditions that still 
encourage warriors to own guns complicate the scenario.  
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Because most of the locals in Kenya and Uganda do not get timely 
information about issues discussed by administrative leaders during border meetings, 
negative rumors circulate after these meetings. Compounding this is the fact that 
government officials or extension workers typically do not speak local languages and 
most of the locals do not speak Kiswahili and are illiterate. This makes contact that much 
thinner. The attitude of some government officials, who believe that they were posted in 
these regions as a form of punishment, only contributes to their lack of urgency. The 
impact of such individuals is negative, as they have little interest in really implementing 
any deterrence measures or government projects.  
The other factors that contribute to failure include the marginalization of 
these communities from mainstream development and the unequal distribution of national 
resources. This plays a major role in inflaming ethnic tensions and discontent. Among 
these communities there are widespread feelings of neglect by government at all levels. 
Strong feelings of deprivation and neglect provide fertile grounds for ethnic groups to 
engage in communal violence and confrontation. The governments’ failure to address the 
scarcity of resources, proliferation of arms, and lack of infrastructure discourages 
hardworking and motivated peace workers. Also a number of NGOs have collapsed 
owing to corruption, mismanagement, and political infighting. 
Underdevelopment, neglect, and poverty are manifest in the absence of 
basic services (e.g., education and health) and infrastructure (e.g., water, sanitation, 
electricity, roads, and communication), as well as perpetual reliance on relief food. Any 
positive deterrence measures toward a durable peace need to address most of these 
problems and break the cycle of poverty, friction, and conflict.  
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VI. WHAT CAN BE DONE? 
To alleviate the problem of raids and counter-raids among Turkana, Pokots, and 
Karamojong of Uganda, I would suggest addressing underdevelopment in the region and 
the following issues. 
A. WATER 
Since water seems to be a major cause of pastoral conflicts, both governments 
should ensure that there is enough water by constructing valley dams to obviate the 
movement of pastoralists in search of water. There are also opportunities and potentials in 
water catchment areas like Kidepo Valley in Karamoja, the Turkwell, and Suam, Kerio 
Valleys in Kenya, as well as Lake Turkana in Kenya, that can be leveraged for water to 
provide sustainable livelihood options to the people of this region.  
B. COMMUNITY POLICING 
The employment and deployment of home-guard groups has been tried as a 
traditional policing method in the past but yielded few results or failed in some cases. In 
too many cases home guards collaborate with the raiders or those who support and 
sympathize with them. This is why community policing offers an attractive alternative. 
The introduction of community policing in Kenya and Uganda has been undertaken in 
countries in the Great Lakes region, for instance Rwanda, Burundi and even the war-torn 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Community policing can help control the illegal 
movement of livestock and alleviate corruption and police malpractice.  
This approach was pioneered in the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
South Africa, where it has extremely worked well. Kenya launched the strategy a few 
years ago and it is still in its infancy there. The pilot program involves working very 
closely with Uganda, and has incorporated East African community member countries 
with a view to minimizing crime and eradicating livestock raids along common borders. 
This should appeal to the local populations since the affected communities will be 
involved in providing the police or government agencies with timely information. What 
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is required other than more resources is to have the police forces throughout the sub 
region undergo some common training in community policing and education regarding 
the appropriate law in order to avoid violations of human rights. This will help to win the 
hearts and minds of the local people who always blame the police or the military for 
harassment, flawed procedures, lack of understanding, and insufficient training. 
C. IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE 
Farming has the potential to provide sustainable socioeconomic development in 
some of the districts under study. It can provide an alternative source of income, food 
security, and farm byproducts (e.g. hay) that can support livestock in times of insufficient 
grazing. Limited irrigation is currently being practiced along the main rivers, such as the 
Wei Wei, Suam, Turkwel, and in the Karamojong area. The rivers have the potential for 
gravity irrigation. This offers a development that can be taken advantage of to cut 
overdependence on livestock. Such projects would not only bring more cash in to 
communities, thereby alleviating high poverty levels, but would provide gainful 
employment for youth who are being lured away to join private armies, with the ultimate 
aim of raiding their neighbors for monetary gains.  
The poor state of irrigation furrows based on traditional methods has hampered 
growth of irrigated agriculture in a number of districts. There is a need to empower the 
communities to manage them properly and to introduce more modern methods of 
irrigation through partnerships between the community and key stakeholders operating in 
the region. The private sector should be incorporated for the simple reason of marketing. 
Where soils are rich these could be better exploited with assistance from the 
government. Most cereal crops like maize, millet, sorghum, and beans have been tried 
and the yields are good. People can even plant their crops twice a year in some areas due 
to the warm weather. Agricultural reports show that fruits perform even better than 
cereals. Some of this potential is being realized, but due to lack of support and insecurity-
related issues, promising projects have been closed down, particularly those that were 
being supported by NGOs and run by people perceived by politicians during their 
election campaigns to be outsiders.  
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The governments of Kenya and Uganda, with the support of NGO and civil 
society, should encourage the local people through education and social seminars to 
consider agro-based farming where applicable, alongside livestock keeping. For this to 
work, both governments would have to address long-term land-tenure issues in order to 
prevent the possibility of continued conflict over land. 
D. MINERALS 
Small gold deposits, limestone deposits and, to some extent, oil are scattered all 
over the area of study, but these have not been commercially exploited and where money 
has been made the local communities have not benefited. However, strategic challenges 
associated with mining include environmental degradation and poor marketing and 
returns. Any mining initiatives must address the need for better regulated exploitation of 
mineral wealth in order to minimize the effects of uncontrolled artisanal mining. Potential 
strategic initiatives should focus on undertaking surveys to first establish the commercial 
viability of existing mineral resources and determine how they can be extracted for the 
benefit of the local communities and contribute to the countries’ export earnings. For 
instance the Karamojong region has limestone and marble deposits that could be 
exploited to benefit the people. The Moroto region in Karamoja supplies the Tororo 
factory with the raw materials for cement. Yet, members of the Matheniko community 
(Karamojong) in the limestone rich area feel marginalized, exploited, and cheated, and all 
these contribute to resentment. The Pokots share similar sentiments regarding a limestone 
factory in Turkwell. At the very least, local youth should be hired in greater numbers to 
provide casual labor in the factories. 
E. MEDICINAL PLANTS 
The potential exists for commercial utilization of medicinal plants such as aloe 
vera or Gum Arabica, which are readily available in Turkana, West Pokot, and Karamoja 
District. These medicinal plants have not been utilized or exploited to the benefit of the 
locals who do not have technical production skills. Most women sell these products in 
local markets as traditional medicine (sakit). Many local people find them efficacious. 
There is a need to harness this resource and develop a marketing strategy for these 
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products. If locals engage in capacity building and developed cooperative societies, they 
could take advantage of available global markets and strengthen their bargaining position. 
Likewise, Jatropha Curcas, a popular nut found in Karimoja, can be used in the 
production of biodiesel, soap, and oil. Also there is the potential to exploit wood products 
from the Cherangani and Seker hills for pulp and paper production and other wood-based 
products.  
F. WIND, SOLAR ENERGY, AND OIL 
Travel through this area makes one realize that the districts under study enjoy 
long periods of sunshine and windy conditions that are suitable for solar and wind energy 
generation. The locals, with the assistance of the government, can tap or harvest this 
resource provided they have the necessary technology. Current technologies tend to be 
costly and unsuited to the mobile lifestyles of the pastoralist communities. But, provision 
of clean sources of alternative energy would slow the cutting down of trees, which is too 
common throughout the area. The potential of solar energy and electrification could 
change the lifestyle of the people, as well as boost their opportunity for development. 
G. PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN 
Women are generally influential members in any community, whether they are 
literate or not. They can play a critical role as active participants in decision-making 
processes and community-based conflict initiatives. In conflict-prone areas like the 
Kenyan–Ugandan border, they are the first to fall victims and suffer most in the process. 
In many cases they suffer from various war crimes, crimes against humanity, including 
sexually-based violence that is used as a weapon of war. Despite traumatic experiences, 
women have already demonstrated, through their initiatives, that they are strong and 
dedicated actors in the peace, and hence deterrence, process. It is therefore important to 
strongly bring them on board for achieving long-term stability. Both governments, if not 
the entire region, should support the creation of women’s fora for peace and should do so 
at the local, sub regional, national, and regional levels. 
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H. POLITICAL SUPPORT 
Parliament should be an instrument for peace. Parliamentarians, politicians, 
elders, religious leaders, youth leaders, clan leaders, teachers, and NGOS are the links or 
bridges between government and the governed, between the capital and the outlying 
regions, and among constituencies and communities within countries, especially in areas 
where communication networks are poor. They can easily disseminate the message of 
peace if the will is there and if it is exploited well. Therefore, the parliament has a duty to 
settle conflicts peacefully and not to engage in warlordism as practiced in Somalia. 
Parliamentarians are expected to be both more proactive and neutral in setting the 
political agenda for peace and prosperity, while articulating the needs of all the people, to 
build confidence and prevent escalation of cross-border conflicts. Parliaments in both 
Kenya and Uganda must accelerate the ratification of treaties and the harmonization of 
legislation on small-arms proliferation. They must also explain these developments to the 
people and frequently meet to discuss and advocate for regional peace. It is also up to 
each parliament, working with the executive, to devise a method of allocating resources 
fairly, so as to meet the socioeconomic requirements of the marginalized pastoral 
communities. No branch of government should be seen to be mismanaging government 
or donor funds. Every effort needs to be made to ensure transparency.  
I. JOINT AND COORDINATED DISARMAMENT  
Joint and coordinated disarmament can effectively go hand in hand with 
development. In fact, this may be the only way to ensure that a durable security can 
prevail. If warriors are presented with genuine, alternative means of livelihood then they 
should be more willing to voluntarily disarm. The capacity and trust are what is lacking. 
This is why the pastoralist communities are not giving up all their guns. Col Paul Lokech, 
the director of operations and training, UPDF Third Division, argues that the Karamojong 
solution requires a serious and committed disarmament that is followed closely by 




mental disarmament. This means that, as disarmament is being carried out, there is a need 
to simultaneously consider mobilization, education, and how to empower the people 
through economic development.  
The UPDF has started a forced education program among the Karamojong. It is 
expected that if this works then it will impact on security and development. Social-
education workers are among those in favor of rural youth going to school. But due to the 
attitudes that youth and the local people have towards education, they don’t voluntarily 
attend—hence, forced education. Ideally, forced education will help change their thinking 
and the traditional belief that all livestock belongs to them. To compel education, the 
government could introduce laws that all chiefs or parents who do not send their children 
to school will be punished. Reports by Karuhanga James, a senior researcher with the 
Great Lakes Centre for Strategic Studies (GLCSS), indicate that the school-going 
population in Karamojong is about thirty percent of the countrywide estimate of eighty 
percent. This indicates how important it to invest more in education. 
Joint operations to disarm pastoralists can only be successful if the populations 
living in the areas affected are closely involved and actively participate in such 
operations. Therefore, efforts to sensitize and mobilize the populations and the local 
leadership and administration will be necessary in both countries. The need for well-
equipped forces to facilitate sustainable disarmament goes without saying. This means a 
regional disarmament committee needs to be created with joint command and control and 
standardized operating procedures (SOP) to closely coordinate, oversee, and objectively 
monitor disarmament operations with activities to be linked to regional strategies aimed 
at eradicating international trafficking in small arms and light weapons. Efforts should 
also be made in the realms of effective communications and psychological operations, 
and media should be involved to a greater extent than they are now.  
Planners should be encouraged to establish community-based security systems via 
civic actions like roads, veterinary and health services that involve the military and 
community leaders in recovering and redistributing raided animals, and other activities to 
reinforce stability in the area. Once this cooperation is agreed upon, three types of 
military units will be needed: engineering, medical, and air cavalry. Pastoralist 
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communities never carry out cross-border or intrastate cattle raids when gunships are in 
the area. Their presence, even just on a temporary basis, has a critical psychological 
effect on the communities in regard to maintaining peace and cooperation.  
J. BORDER SECURITY ROADS (BOSERS)  
The construction of secure roads for easy transport of security forces, supplies, 
and rapid response to raids and counter-raids is paramount. The first set of activities that 
both governments should engage in is the building of border security roads (BOSERS). 
This will make this entire area more accessible. Roads are also critical in facilitating the 
movement of commerce and would especially help women who engage in cross-border 
business. At the same time, airfields and landing zones should be constructed to enhance 
air surveillance. 
Underlying the use of the military is the simple fact that it possesses capacities 
that are too often underutilized. Although it costs states money to train and equip forces, 
a more secure country should generate the revenues to support such activities. Once 
completed, such projects should be handed over to the ministries responsible for 
maintenance and follow up as required.  
K. BORDER SECURITY SOCIOECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
NETWORKS (BOSSEENS)  
The second important set of activities requiring military involvement is the 
construction and development of infrastructure such as market shelters, irrigation canals, 
schools, health facilities, and housing units for security personnel and the displaced, in 
addition to boreholes, dams, and roads. These elements are critical to addressing issues of 
marginalization, especially of women, many of whom engage in small cross-border 
businesses. The countries’ military units can easily be utilized here. Alternatively, the 
region can invite in foreign forces to help engage in civil–military actions in the form of 
combined joint-training exercises (e.g., “Natural Fire”) to open up otherwise closed areas. 
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L. CONSTRAINTS 
The following are the major constraints encountered by both governments in 
trying to fight cross-border raids and counter-raids in the pastoral zone. The first is that 
pastoral communities are reluctant to disarm since they see a lot of value in the gun. The 
motivation to hand over their weapon does not exist. The pastoral groups distrust 
governments. At the same time, each state remains suspicious of the other with neither 
taking the lead to permanently disarm their communities. This calls for the states in the 
region to collectively cooperate and commit resources to zero tolerance regarding the 
flow of arms into the region. In a situation where it is not possible to restrict gun 
trafficking due to the porous borders, control measures should be put in place to ensure 
that those in possession of guns don’t become a menace to peace and order in the region. 
This can be done through registration of the guns being held by each household if 
disarmament is not successful.  
M. BENEFITS 
Consider, just some of the synergies:  
• The communities who share a common border will cooperate and add 
value to their common resources, thereby overcoming the natural 
divisiveness that artificial, but now national, borders often create. 
• Both Kenya and Uganda will benefit from the generation of new economic 
activities that will lead to new revenue streams for local authorities and 
each country at large.  
• Another category of beneficiaries are special groups such as unemployed 
men, women, and youth who will be engaged in local construction 
projects. They will have an opportunity to earn income and learn skills.  
• State militaries will gain experience through civic action and will also 
better understand the geographic and social terrain of the country.  
• Medical corps can be used to reach remote areas and address the issues of 
HIV/AIDS and other diseases, thereby helping preserve health of the 
whole country. 
• Such projects also allow international development partners to participate 
in regional activities such as environmental protection that benefit tribes 
living across the borders, as well as people elsewhere who fear that effects 
of global environmental degradation and climate change.  
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N. REGIONAL ACTORS 
The long porous borders separating Kenya from Uganda and south Sudan 
represent a major challenge. Policing and monitoring them require coordination from 
regional governments. It’s believed that over 40,000 guns are to be found among the 
Pokot and Turkana and the same estimate is likely to hold for Karamojong. The influx of 
arms is due to insufficient patrolling and policing of the common borders and inadequate 
government control in these areas. Kenya is a major transit route from Somalia, much as 
Uganda is from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Dinka and Toposa of 
Sudan are sources of arms into Kenya and Uganda. The reality on the ground is that both 
Kenya and Uganda can disarm, but without Sudan, Ethiopia or Somalia doing the same, 
they may only be repairing one seam of a leaky bucket. What is called is for regional and 
international actors to support the affected countries in this critical endeavor. Meanwhile, 
there is also the need to establish more police or security posts along Uganda’s and 
Kenya’s borders. Again, though, this needs to be a joint enterprise with a regional joint 
plan to deal with the security threat poised by the proliferation of small arms and 
pastorally related conflicts throughout the border region. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
This study has attempted to provide an analysis of raids and counter-raids by 
pastoralists in northwestern Kenya and eastern Uganda. These interlinked phenomena 
have had adverse effects on the people of the region by creating an environment of 
violent conflict, insecurity, and displacement. As I have pointed out, cattle’s rustling has 
been transformed from a cultural practice to an international commercial venture 
organized by cattle warlords able to market livestock and their products. This has been 
made possible, in part, through the proliferation of small arms. With them cattle warlords 
can too often outmatch, and even undermine, the security forces. It is also evident that the 
adverse environment (ecology) and a lack of alternative sources of livelihood have 
promoted raiding and counter-raiding in this region. Policymakers in the governments of 
both Kenya and Uganda should identify better ways and means to support marginalized 
pastoral communities in the Karimoja, West Pokot, and Turkana districts among others. 
There is an attitude by some government officials that pastoralists are more 
conservative and more resistant to change than are societies with mixed agricultural 
economies due to their adaptation to a harsh ecological environment and the intensity 
with which they value livestock. If such perceptions persist, states are likely to continue 
to ignore and neglect the welfare of pastoralists in terms of development and economic 
inputs into their areas. For the sake of border security, this attitude has to change and 
more effort must be focused on the pastoral communities.  
To a large extent, it has only been NGOs and missionaries who have attempted to 
alleviate the plight of the pastoral communities through provision of schools, boreholes, 
health centers, and other services. The government itself needs to do more if it hopes to 
turn people into good, productive, peaceful citizens Available land should now go to 
deserving pastoral communities, not as in previous years when politically connected rich 
people benefited. The incorporation of pastoral communities into the market economy  
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should be especially encouraged via the sale of livestock and livestock products. At the 
very least, both governments need to take more positive and serious approach to 
supporting the work and efforts of the NGOs. 
Measures like accurate investigative policing of cattle thefts should be put in 
place, with well-trained officers. Both aerial and foot patrols need to be undertaken to 
check on livestock suspected of being stolen property. This is where brands on cattle 
should help. Local leaders and NGOs should focus on negotiating the return of stolen 
livestock and restrain the victims from taking the law into their own hands since some of 
them still think, in traditional terms that “all livestock belong to us.” Cattle warlords 
should both be isolated and educated regarding the need to change their method of 
livelihood.  
The security forces must refrain from using excessive force and mass 
punishments as these are likely to lead to future retaliation and escalated conflicts. It is 
critical that authorities adapt a more participatory approach, engaged in dialogue, 
consultation and coordination to address developmental bottlenecks within all three 
pastoral communities. In turn, this will contribute to building credible trust and a 
legitimate network of peace actors, structures and institutions, which cross-border 
communities can refer to whenever disputes or conflicts occur.  
The peace industry used to be reputable. However, increasingly it seems to run by 
people who are out to make themselves rich quickly. There is a need to set up accounting 
mechanisms for donor- and government-funded projects in order for pastoral 
communities to see the benefits of these projects. As part of confidence building, NGOs, 
civil-society actors, and those engaged in peace initiatives should meet in the conflict 
region and talk to people and implement actions based on the needs and priorities voiced 
by the people themselves. Peace meetings should be undertaken in areas perceived to be 
dangerous in order to meet and lure the warriors into accepting strategies of change. In 
most cases, meetings take place in government offices, towns, or hotels far from the 
warriors. This defies and contradicts the logic of capacity building. It should be noted that 
cattle owners and warriors live in the bush. The warriors can easily be encouraged to 
participate by offering incentives like food and soft drinks during meetings, and T-shirts. 
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This will also serve to encourage them to attend future meetings. Tribal translators should 
be available so that the intended message can reach the people since most of them are 
illiterate. The selected NGOs as well as those engaged in peace initiatives should be 
conversant with the people’s cultures and needs, and should be ready to operate in a 
changing environment.  
As mentioned in previous chapters, people often make peace on their own out of 
necessity during periods of environmental scarcity. This is the time when governments 
and NGOs should be aggressive at introducing and reinforcing deterrence measures since 
the people are desperate. Both governments should positively exploit such opportunities. 
As has also been discussed, there is a need to focus greater attention on the 
development of the pastoral zone for its other potential contributions beyond livestock 
and livestock products. For instance, it is worth considering tourism and the area’s 
mineral potential. Lake Turkana is already a major tourist attraction, while West Pokot 
and Karimoja are rich in minerals and could attract eco-tourists and others. For these 
sorts of schemes to work, there have to be good working relations between Kenya and 
Uganda so that no raiding or violence occurs. 
The security situation, from a regional perspective, requires a show of superior 
force over the armed pastoral communities in the region. Personal experience suggests 
that the success of security forces will depend not on the size of the army deployed, but 
on having a small and well equipped police anti– stock-theft unit or a well equipped 
quick-reaction force of the army. Such units have to be better equipped than the bandits 
and cattle rustlers. Such forces, when deployed, should work very closely with the local 
communities and their local leaders. Regular meetings should be encouraged at all levels 
to review the security situation more regularly and to discuss regional development 
strategies.  
In spite of the efforts currently made by both governments, clashes often occur 
between the different Karamojong groups, the Pokot, and the Turkana of Kenya over 
access to and use of water. Where possible, ways to harvest and store rain water should 
be introduced to the people so that they will have water during the dry season.This may 
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involve developing projects along the border and working out mechanisms for sharing 
designed to bring warring pastoral groups together. Many projects of this kind could be 
initiated by Kenya and Uganda. It is possible that with a common regional strategy to 
deal with resource use problems in the region, each country could find it easier to initiate 
projects that would have far reaching impact in terms of improving the livelihoods of 
their citizens. Unfortunately, up until now instability has made development secondary to 
achieving peace and security in this region and has discouraged those who wish to 
venture into crop farming. In other words, both governments must end insecurity in the 
form of raids and counter-raids in the pastoral regions of Northwestern Kenya and eastern 
Uganda for any meaningful development to take place. 
The lack of political will on the part of some leaders who are alleged to provide 
protection to cattle warlords is another obstacle that must be addressed by both 
governments concurrently. Politicians and elites in both countries should work and 
support the governments’ efforts to fight insecurity in the affected areas. They should 
stop defending their people in parliament, public meetings, and through the press, 
especially when elections are approaching. Their activities can easily be perceived as 
promoting and encouraging warlike activities. It further dilutes the efforts of district 
security committees and peace initiatives of which the politicians are themselves 
members. Politicians should be peacemakers and not ethno-nationalists. Likewise, 
passage of information to the people is very important in areas where the infrastructure or 
networking is very poor. Regional and international partners should be of great assistance 
in this area, where peace groups rely on government security forces to provide escorts so 
that they can launch their missions effectively. There is potential here for tremendous 
cooperation. The two governments can plan the most appropriate locations for borehole 
development or the rehabilitation of disused ones. The borehole projects should be 
institutionalized, empowering selected community leaders to mobilize to improve water 
governance and management, especially where the facility is a common user.  
In sum, the situation calls for a combined effort by both governments, as well as 
the affected pastoral communities, NGOs, and others, to address the problems described 
here and to formulate a strategy for finding solutions acceptable to all who live in the 
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area. It is clear that raids and counter-raids go beyond the capability of the Kenyan and 
Ugandan police. The international community can provide invaluable support through 
intelligence sharing and training. But also, it is important to re-emphasize that so long as 
those in these pastoral communities continue to live a lifestyle dictated by their harsh 
environment and influenced not just by cultural beliefs, but by poverty, illiteracy, 
underdevelopment, and tribal rivalry, the predicaments they are presently facing will 
continue to stay with them and any development efforts will continue to drag due to 
insecurity.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis makes a number of recommendations to both the Kenyan and Ugandan 
governments and to donor communities when it comes to tackling the issue of raids and 
counter-raids along the border between Kenya and Uganda where pastoralism is a major 
factor or source of livelihood. These are: 
• Examine all possible ways to improve the security and protection of 
people and their property. 
• Promote security reforms, to include the capacity building of the police, 
military, and border guards, improve their standards of training and 
methods of criminal investigation in dealing with pastoralists. 
• Strengthen the response structures for conflict early warning. While 
concrete steps have been taken to promote the exchange and sharing of 
information and analysis among the cross-border networks, timely 
response is still weak. One way to address this is by linking the cross-
border networks with the CEWARN mechanism introduced by IGAD. 
• Expand deterrence measures and peace work beyond the study area to 
achieve sustainable results. This means including neighboring districts and 
coordinating across international borders to encompass the Toposa of 
southern Sudan who clash with Karamojong and Turkana over resources. 
• Educate and sensitize the locals about the costs associated with tribal and 
pastoral violence. Pay particular attention to the use and misuse of 
firearms. This should be done through constant seminars and workshops 
involving various branches of government, various NGOs, respected 
community leaders (e.g., political, spiritual, traditional leaders, medicine 
men, soothsayers, respected elders, intellectuals, and appointed chiefs). 
Hold such discussions from the village through the district level. 
Harmonize laws relating to firearms countries and ensure closer 
collaboration between the governments and between their security forces 
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down to the grassroots and home-guard level. Firearms should only be in 
the hands of those authorized by law to carry them and people should be 
discouraged from taking the law into their own hands. They should be 
encouraged to report any infractions to relevant authorities.  
• Document and disseminate lessons learned, coupled with systematic 
follow-up so that successful experiences can be widely shared amongst the 
warring communities. 
• Support the development and capacity of government ministries to service 
the region through agencies working at the district level.  
• Inject more capital into pastoralist development programs to address 
critical needs such as water, roads, communications (including mobile 
telephone transmissions and community radio-broadcast capacity) and 
markets. Facilitate practical, problem-solving partnerships between local 
government and cross-border community organizations to share basic 
services and strengthen community structures and mechanisms for the 
management of cross-border conflict and peace and capacity building. 
This will require greater investment in training, to ensure that the cross-
border structures and networks remain sustainable over the long term.  
• Give considered attention to improving peoples’ standards of living. 
Diversification away from dependency on livestock is a significant issue, 
but one that neither country can afford to ignore or can afford to undertake 
in a culturally insensitive, disruptive manner. 
• Re-establish and improve infrastructure so that closed areas can be 
accessed with ease.  
• Take into account sociocultural practices such as pastoralists’ needs and 
migratory patterns and the location of existing wells and boreholes when 
planning future water development, as this has a bearing on grazing 
resources. 
• Conduct long-term surveys to document the number of people and 
livestock accessing specified strategic water points. Again, this is 
especially critical when planning for long-term water projects.  
• Review the impacts of development on laws and regulations relating to 
land tenure and access to water. 
• Rehabilitate non-operational water sources, especially those that need 
minor repairs.  
• Encourage more rainwater-harvesting initiatives, especially sand dams 
which are less prone to pollution and high evaporation losses. 
• Improve the quality of water for human consumption through provision of 
appropriate off-take structures, regulations, and community involvement.  
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